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  I.  System versus différance 
 
Niklas Luhmann and Jacques Derrida have made the same diagnosis of the sober world of 
lawyers and economists.
1 Where other people observe rational decisions based on cost / 
benefit calculations and on rule / fact subsumtions, their diagnosis is:  madness of decision. 
In contrast to all analyses of rational choice, games theory and decision theory and to all 
promises of normative argumentation and discursive rationality, the protagonists of 
autopoiesis and deconstruction insist that the every day routines of legal and economic 
decisions contain a component of madness, irrationality, mystery and even sacredness.  
The irrational is not to be viewed as a negligible remainder in a process of increasing 
rationalisation but as the driving force of the decision. According to Luhmann: 
 
The mystery of the decision and the mystery of the hierarchy respectively 
support each other. Both exhibit an unspeakable (dare one say, religious) 
element, which makes them into what they are (Luhmann, 1993c: 287). 
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According to Derrida law and justice works 
  
...without calculation and without rules, without reason or without rationality...we 
can recognise in it, indeed accuse, identify a madness. And perhaps another 
sort of mystique. And deconstruction is mad about this kind of justice. Mad 
about this desire for justice (Derrida 1990: 52).  
 
The deconstructive consensus held by the opponents goes even further. The irrational not 
only occasionally breaks into ecstatic moments of the calculation of decisions but reaches 
the foundations of formal rationality. Derrida and Luhmann are in agreement that 
arbitrariness, inconsistencies, antinomies, paradoxes, and even violence, lie at the bottom 
of the most refined constructs in economic and legal action. However, exposing the 
irrational is not the end of analysis in the spirit of Carl Schmitt’s decisionism (Schmitt, 1996; 
1985) but, instead, constitutes its beginning. Both theories are not at all aimed at 
denouncing the detailed practices of justification and calculation in economics and law as 
mere ideological mystification of power constellations.
2 On the contrary, Derrida and 
Luhmann raise drastically the expectations of the quality of economic and legal calculations 
– despite their paradoxes. Exposing the irrationality of a decision does not, according to 
both authors, mean suspending the claims concerning social justice but, on the contrary, it 
means taking the normative requirements of justice even more seriously.
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However astonishing the convergence of autopoiesis and différance may be, the crucial 
point is not  to uncover isomorphies, analogies and selective affinities.
4 Usually, systems 
theorists prefer a selective incorporation technique.They decorate the fassades of their 
autopoietic palaces with deconstructive fragments of différance, of itération, of trace. This 
is certainly attractive for theory building but ultimately leads only to an involution of the 
architectonics without altering the foundations. If Jean Paul is right that ‘wit’ means the 
connection of remote ideas, then this decorative incorporation is as irrelevant as the   4
rigorous confrontation of deconstruction and autopoiesis preferred by Derridists which 
ends only in reciprocal immunisation. 
 
By contrast, I would prefer a reading of a reciprocal paranoia in Derrida’s and Luhmann’s 
writing which exposes a dynamic of mutual persecutions between the theories. Indeed, it 
begins with a common analysis of foundational paradoxes in law and economy which binds 
the theories together. But then incompatible reality constructs come in which render the 
theories blind and distrustful to each other. We ought to dispense with all hope of restoring 
sight to the blind and trust to the distrustful. Rather, we should exploit the paranoic dynamic 
itself which is by definition, a 'form of delirium characterised by convictions which despite 
being apparently similar are in reality conflicting and are not capable of being altered 
neither through logic nor through experience, e.g. delusions of grandeur or fears of 
persecution' (Felice 1987, 1432). Autopoiesis and deconstruction – what do we gain from 
of their reciprocal fears of persecution which end in a hectic whirl of deconstructive moves 
and systemic counter moves, in an ascending relation of stabilisations and destabilisations, 
in a dance of reciprocal plagues. This reading of para-noia becomes productive when the 
closed world of fictions of one theory reappears in the other’s fictitious world. Thus: 
autopoietic systems as Jacques Derrida’s nightmare, the gift of justice as Niklas 
Luhmann’s redemption. 
 
  II. Foundational Paradoxes 
 
First, it is amazing how radically they depart from common assumptions revoking the 
consensus on the foundations of legal and economic institutions. Courage is necessary if 
not, an extravagance, if one, like Derrida (1992, ch.1), does not wish to ground a social 
theory of the economy on exchange and reciprocity, but instead wishes to see the 
foundations of economic action in the structure of the gift. The pure gift relation, according 
to Derrida’s conceptualisation, is totally asymmetrical, it means giving without gratitude. It 
exposes a radical non-reciprocal generosity which is destroyed if only trace elements of 
symmetry, reciprocity and even recognition, not to speak of the social bond of gratitude,   5
exist. Such courage is also necessary if one, like Luhmann (1993d: 545; 1988), refuses to  
conceive of law’s foundation in terms of a Grundnorm, of an ultimate rule of recognition, 
substantive and procedural principles of legal validity, or in terms of its socio-political 
legitimation, but in terms of the extreme borderline case of pure self-referentiality of legal 
operations which fall into paradoxical confusion through their self-application. It is precisely 
their radicalism which offers a new view on the foundations of legal and economic 
institutions, a view which until now was seen to be based on a flaw of reasoning (Fletcher, 
1985: 1279). Legal and economic institutions, Derrida and Luhmann insist, are not based 
on rational principles but on dangerous antinomies and paradoxes which not only destroy 
their legitimacy but also paralyse each operation and calculation through their self-
contradictory structures. 
 
As regards the founding paradox of law, however, despite the far reaching identity of the 
analysis of the initial consensus, our opponents’ views are suddenly reversed into being 
completely incompatible with each other. Both commence with a critique of law’s violence 
which is informed by Walter Benjamin (1996  {DT Bd. II 179-203}) to the extent that the 
customary critiques of law which refer to ideology and power and which expose law as the 
expression of economic or political interests are rejected as being superficial. At a deeper 
level, both authors view law as caught in the paradoxes of its own self-referentiality.
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Since the origin of authority, the foundation or ground, the position of the law 
can’t by definition rest on anything but themselves, they are themselves a 
violence without ground. Which is not to say that they are in themselves unjust, 
in the sense of ‘illegal’. They are neither legal nor illegal in their founding 
moment (Derrida, 1990: 943).  
 
Luhmann (1988a: 154) identifies the same phenomenon, he sees at the bottom of legal rule 
hierarchies ‘the paradox of the binary code applied to itself’. For both authors, all attempts 
to ground law on legitimate normative foundations or even on a concept of justice are, in the 
end, useless. They are all confronted with the violence of the primordial distinction between   6
legal and illegal which in itself cannot be revealed as legal, legitimate or just, but merely as 
violent arbitrariness. 
 
The foundational paradox is the point where the bifurcation of deconstruction and 
autopoiesis begins. Derrida does not shy away from the precipice of law’s paradox and 
attempts to enter the dark worlds of the paradox with a bold interpretation of the original 
violence of law which leads him to a mysterious distinction of various legal forces (Derrida, 
1990: 1027ff.). Reinterpreting Benjamin’s famous essay on law and violence, he 
distinguishes between a mythical foundational violence which establishes the positivity of 
the state and the law only through blood shed, and a divine foundational violence 
establishing a different justice which is destructive and even annihilating but which is life-
supporting without blood shed. It is at this stage that Derrida formulates the most 
provocative paradox: the distinction between positivity and justice is itself indecipherable; 
there are no criteria which might distinguish between mythical and divine violence, not only 
before the decision but also after the decision. The question is merely postponed to an 
indeterminate  future which is, in effect, a delegation to an infinite responsibility. 
 
Luhmann detests such precipices; for him, these results of deconstructive analysis further 
confirm the paralysing effects of the paradox which gather strength the more one attempts 
to shed light on the darkness of the legal paradox. The results are merely Derridian ‘verbal 
acoustics’, obscurities of speech and the typical deconstructive gestures to shock people 
with dark paradoxes: ‘... a mixture of arbitrariness and paralysis’.
6 Luhmann explicitly 
proceeds in the opposite direction: while it is fruitless to develop a theory which only 
repeats the inconsistencies, the unruliness, the darkness of the legal paradox in a different 
language, a creative use of the paradox becomes possible once one enquires the social 
techniques of de-paradoxification. De-paradoxification means to invent new distinctions 
which do not deny the paradox but displace it temporarily and, thus,relieve it of its 
paralysing power. This leads Luhmann to detailed historical and sociological analyses of 
how in European legal history institutionalised distinctions between natural and positive law   7
or, currently, distinctions between legislation and adjudication, have produced their 
impressive cultural achievements despite or precisely because of the legal paradox.
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Thus, contrary to first appearances, the foundational paradox of law is not Derrida’s and 
Luhmann’s common object of analysis but is merely their common runway which they  then, 
however, use for a take-off in opposite directions: the autopoietic escape from and the 
deconstructive search for the paradoxes of law. If one then has a closer look at the 
foundational paradox of the economy, the way how they treat it differently indicates that it is 
not yet sufficient to identify their difference of paradoxification and de-paradoxfication as 
merely a difference in cognitive interests, analytical directions and conceptual apparatus. 
Already their formulations of the economic paradox are so different that their common 
starting point is barely recognisable; rather, a more fundamental difference between 
autopoiesis and deconstruction comes into sight. 
 
For Luhmann, the circulation of the economy is made possible at the historical moment 
when economic institutions circumvent successfully the paradox of scarcity, according to 
which the richer supply of the one is the greater need of the other, more abstractly: every 
access to scarce goods which serves the lessening of scarcity increases scarcity. Only by 
rendering this blockage invisible can the paradox be overcome and the circulation of the 
economy be commenced. This occurs when the effects of access to rare resources is 
bifurcated and effectively institutionalised as a binary code in economic action. 
 
For he who acts quickly, the access to scarce resources lessens. For all 
others, it increases...condensced scarcity appears then as the difference to 
have/not to have (Luhmann, 1988b: 181). 
 
Derrida determines the conditions of possibility of economic circulation from a different 
starting point, not from the paradoxes of access to scarce goods, but from the impossibility 
of the pure gift. The gift relation is the exact opposite of the exchange relation of the 
economy but, at the same time, provides the stimulus for the circulation of the economy.   8
The founding paradox of the economy arises in the moment when the pure gift relation, 
which exists before any reference to subjectivity, constitutes the subject: 
 
a subject neither gives or receives. On the contrary, it is constituted precisely 
in order to subdue this hubris or impossibility through the calculation and the 
exchange of power which is announced in the promise of the gift (Derrida 
1992 {37}). 
 
And yet, both versions of the economic paradox coincide in the concept of property. The 
bifurcation of the effects of access, the coding of property as the difference between to 
have/not to have, and the attribution to semantic artefacts of property owners and non-
property owners leads, according to Luhmann, away from the blockades of the scarcity 
paradox and into the dynamics of the economy. According to Derrida, the constitution of the 
subject as an offerer and receiver destroys the purity of the gift and renders the calculations 
of the economy possible through the recognition of the property of the subject.  
 
But Derrida’s interest in the circulation of the economy is not orientated to Luhmann’s social 
techniques of deparadoxification, to the socially constructed order of the property code, 
later the money code, and economic programms. Instead he analyses how the continual 
production of the gift is permanently interrupting economic circulation, how the irrationality 
of the gift is indeed transcending  economic rationality. We do not therefore have two 
competing social theories on the economy before us which illuminate the same subject 
matter from different perspectives and with different cognitive interests. Rather, according 
to their self-understanding, two opposite worlds clash in whose opposites can no longer be 
understood only as the competition of different methods, theories or paradigms. Luhmann’s 
ambitious attempt to construct a theory of society as the phenomenology of communication 
-  based on a strict analogy of Edmund Husserl’s phenomenology of consciousness - 
stands in stark contrast  to Derrida’s explicit refusal to develop a scientific theory. Theory, 
Derrida insists, would be incapable of thinking the gift. Instead, he attempts to revitalise the 
analogy concerning the opposites of thought and epistemology, the opposites of nomenal   9
and phenomenal,  in order to conceive of a 'transcendental illusion of gift' which 'extends 
beyond and exceeds the experience, the knowledge, science, the economy and even 
philosophy'  Derrida, 1992: {44}). 
 
Thus, although they initially agree on the paradoxical foundation of law and economy , both 
schools of thought have in fact nothing to say to each other. Luhmann asks the question how 
de-paradoxification techiques construct the immanence of social institutions and build a 
world of autopoietic social systems, their coding and programming. By contrast, Derrida’s 
thought aims at the transcendence of social institutions through their re-paradoxification 
and proposes a counter-world of différance in which the deconstructive double movement 
permanently exposes the founding antinomies of social institutions as well as the 
paradoxical paralysis of concrete decisions in law and economy. Luhmann’s world and 
Derrida’s counter-world stand orthogonally against each other and cannot directly influence 
the other. It is, however, precisely their mutual closure that makes them threaten, persecute 
and haunt each other. 
 
 
  III. Derrida’s Nightmare: Autopoietic Social Systems 
 
Why can indifference, however, not prevail? Why should Niklas Luhmann stalk Jacques 
Derrida following his deconstructive movements step by step? And why should systems 
theorists continuously be intellectually harassed by deconstructionists? Wile the opposing 
features of de-paradoxification and re-paradoxification, of empirical institutional analysis 
and transcendental illusion, of the immanence of social systems and their transcendence by 
différance, can render plausible the way in which they exclude each other they do not 
explain how and why they haunt each other. 
 
There is, however, a different linkage of  autopoiesis and deconstruction. The linkage lies in 
their basic concepts, or rather in their distinctions directrices. Derrida’s distinction between 
writing and speech is drawn in such a way that it is necessarily blind toward Luhmann’s   10
distinction between conscioussness and communication, but is, at the same time, 
continuously provoked by it. On another level, precisely the opposite happens. Luhmann’s 
autopoiesis is permanently provoked by Derrida’s différance but is at the same time unable 
to conceptualise it.  This mutual blindness of their distinction directrices is reponsible for  
their perception of the social and thereby for their views on the possibility of justice.   
 
Derrida and Luhmann start with the same question, namely, why Edmund Husserl’s 
phenomenology of consciousness cannot do justice to social institutions.  Their concern to 
wipe out Husserl’s blind spot concerning society is shared by other contemporary theories 
on 'Justice towards the Other' - Lyotard, Habermas, Levinas.
8 There is a general 
agreement that Husserl’s attempts to integrate society into the philosophy of consciousness  
- the (in)famous Monadengemeinschaft -  has failed (Husserl, 1950: 125, 137, 157). His 
distinction between conscioussness and the outer world has no place for the social and the 
mere phenomenal construction of the world of conscioussness is the reason for the 
principal inadequacy towards social institutions. Society, let alone a multiplicity of 
conscious individuals, can not be conceived adequately by Husserl’s phenomenology. 
Since Husserl describes communication as a mere declaration of signs, meaning is 
produced exclusively in conscioussness. This does not do justice towards the other: the 
other practically only conducts a phenomenological (consciousness-dependent) existence. 
The distinction between transcendental / empirical (ideal / psychological) serves only as a 
poor compensation. While it makes a universal, objective and ideal sphere of meaning 
beyond a single consciousness  possible, it has, however, inherited all the difficulties 
associated with transcendentalism: it is ahistorical, a priori, unempirical, undynamic, highly 
abstract, 'pure' etc. 
 
Lyotard’s phenomenology of language games attempts the exact opposite which, however, 
is bound to repeat and thereby to mirror Husserl’s problems (19). Here, the world is 
constituted by mere constructs of language games (Lyotard, 1987). Conscioussness, inner 
discourse, introspection are thereby made taboo. Since language games are self-
referentially constituted, this theory cannot deal adequately with the inner infinity of   11
conscioussness. Actors are mere pale linguistic constructs of language games. Lyotard’s 
blind spot is to be found at precisely the same place as Husserl’s, however, they find 
themselves at the respective other sides of the distinction between inner/outer  -- 
conscioussness on the one hand and discourse on the other. Husserl’s exclusion of the 
social is paralleled by Lyotard’s exclusion of consciousness. The issue of justice is not, 
according to Lyotard, a problem of being fair to the originality, the infinity and depth of the 
other, but merely a problem in the conflictual relation between different closed discourses. 
The différend can never become a litige.  The différend necessarily ends up in injustice, in 
the violence of one language game to another. 
 
Now, Derrida and Luhmann both attempt to overcome the alternative of consciousness /  
discourse as monopolists in the production of meaning. With the primacy of writing over 
speech and the polemic against the philosophy of conscioussness, Derrida (1998, 1978) 
specifically aims at the blind spot between conciousness and speech. Writing is 
supplementary to this distinction; it undermines the difference between ‘inner’ and ‘outer’ 
processes of meaning which leave a trace. And here is the point  where Derrida’s 
distinction directrice interlocks with Luhmann’s.  In order to circumvent the sterile 
juxtaposition of the philosophy of conscioussness and the theory of language games, 
Derrida’s deconstructs the hierarchy of speech and writing in a double way, into a tangled 
hierarchy and into a secret reversal of the hierarchical relation.
9 This ingenious idea 
matches the originality of Luhmann’s conceptual move. Luhmann (1995: ch. 7) intends to 
overcome the Husserlian Monadengemeinschaft by duplicating the process of  
sensemaking: consciousness and communication are producing separate, independent 
and autonomous worlds of meaning which cannot be reduced to each other. However, the 
two distinctions directrices,  Derrida’s writing / speech and Luhmann’s communication / 
conscioussness, are mutually exclusive. The one distinction  ‘sits on’ the blind spot of the 
other. They cannot be integrated into a synthesis. What remains for the outside observer, is 
a continuous ‘switching’ from one distinction to the other resulting in an almost simultaneous 
observation of the world  which contains two contradictory but at the same time   12
supplementary perspectives. Condition of this supplementarity, if it is to become 
productive, is that the distinctions are capable to shed light on their respective blind spots. 
 
Derrida’s writing/speech-difference exposes an unavoidable blind spot when it comes to 
the peculiarities of social institutions. The distinction is responsible for the (in)famous 
asociological character of deconstruction. Because it forces writing as the impossible third 
party in the difference of conscioussness and speech, it excludes society from 
intertextuality. Deconstruction cannot grasp the autonomy of the social. At the same time it 
cannot do justice to the precipices of the individual consciousness, given that writing cannot 
distinguish communication and conscioussness. As a compensation, deconstruction draws 
from Levinas’ philosophy of alterity which, however, constitutes only another correction of 
the Husserlian blindness to the social. Levinas(1979)  juxtaposes the totality of meaning 
with the infinity of transcendence  and places the reality of the other in the realm of infinity. 
This amounts to  a ‘premature’ sacralisation of the social which makes disappear any 
experience of society in the blind spot of the distinction between totality and infinity. 
 
This is where Derrida’s nightmare begins. Social systems operate in the blind spot of his 
distinction directrice.  He can deconstruct economic and legal institutions but only as texts 
and intertextualities, not as social systems. Their restless autopoietic self-reproduction 
haunts him continuously despite of all attempts of  deconstruction. It is the secret of 
autopoiesis is that social systems are no longer threatened by the paradoxes of their 
deconstructive reading. Autopoietic self-reproduction means that in routine operations they 
are constantly de-paradoxifying their foundational paradox. Thus, they are capable of 
deconstructing deconstruction, of course not in the sense that they can exclude it on a long 
term basis but in the sense that they shift, displace, disseminate, historicize deconstruction 
itself which changes drastically the conditions of its possibility (Luhmann, 1995b; 1993b: 
490). Luhmann’s concepts are Derrida’s non-concepts, autopoietic monsters in the world of 
deconstruction, which constantly stalk paradoxifying efforts with their relentless de-
paradoxification. This is particularly true for Luhmann’s central concepts of social 
autopoiesis, polycontexturality, and second-order cybernetics.    13
 
What is the paradox that is dealt with by social autopoiesis? It is the paradox of alterity,  the 
paralysing self-contradictions that occur in the primordial encounter with the other. Action is 
paralysed whenever Ego makes her action dependent on Alter and vice versa. The 
encounter with the other and the precipices which arise here are, of course, Derrida’s 
continuous theme in his philosophy of gift and in his philosophy of justice (Derrida, 1990: 
959; 1992: {21ff.}). In Luhmann’s theory they appear in the paradox of double contingency 
(Luhmann, 1995: {184ff.}). But their treatment makes the decisive difference. In Luhmann’s 
account, the paradox of the encounter with the other is resolved by the emergence of 
autopoietic social systems. Social systems do not abolish the original paradox but they 
transfer it to a new sphere of meaning, namely, that of communication. Double contingency 
of two self-referential sytems in their inner infiniteness is made bearable when 
communication emerges as an autonomous system of sense production. Communication 
makes the paralysing effects of the paradox vanish because ‘... the self-referentiality of 
social systems presumes an immanent duality so that a circle emerges whose interruptions 
are able to give rise to structures' (Luhmann, 1997: 333).  
 
To be sure, the paradox of alterity remains. But it changes its form, it is reconstructed and 
homogenised within the sphere of communication. Now it loses its  paralysing power for 
two self-referential systems that are reconstructing each other in an infinite and 
unresolvable circularity, and it reappears as the precarious but manageable social 
interdependence of two communicative constructs, ego and alter. The paradoxical effects 
of their encounter are, so to speak, rendered harmless when they are reconstructed in 
communication. But there is a price to pay. While the paradoxes of the encounter with the 
other disappear, the foundational paradoxes of  social systems emerge. Rendering them  
invisible in their turn becomes then the permanent problem of communication.  
 
While Derrida does relentlessly enquire into the paradoxies of constituting subjectivity and 
intersubjectivity, the instruments of deconstruction are designed in such a way that they 
cannot thematise the crucial transformation of the paradox of alterity into the foundational   14
paradoxes of  worlds of communication, among them the paradoxes of law and economy.  
Thus, deconstruction remains hostage to the orginal paradoxes of alterity. This points again 
to Derrida’s deficit of historical and sociological analyses. Specters of Marx are very strong 
on all kinds of spectrologies but very weak when it comes to concrete analyses of 
contemporary society.
10 A deconstructive analysis that took account of  the transformation 
of the paradox of double contingency into the foundational paradoxes of emerging social 
systems, would need to  become historical, especially for its own transformations. While the 
basic structures of the paradox remain the same, social processes of their invisibilisation 
and the threatening moments of their reemergence depend on historical contingencies. The 
paradox itself is, ‘necessary knowledge, a transcendental necessity, the “successor of the 
transcendental subject” ’ (Luhmann, 1997: 755). By contrast, the distinctions which are used 
for de-paradoxification, are dependent on historical-societal conditions of plausibility, of 
acceptability, are contingent on binding knowledge in particular societies. This is how the 
social construction of systems, their continuous deconstruction and their recurrent 
reconstruction become subjects of the sociology of knowledge. What kind of society makes 
particular deparadoxifying distinctions plausible? What kinds of choques exogènes 
expose again the paradoxical foundations of a social institution? The deconstructive 
obsession is thereby thoroughly socialised and historicized. To exorcise  the paradox of 
alterity always remains a possibility but remarkably it has ‘no consequences’ (Fish, 1989), 
whilst the successful reparadoxification of concrete social system which must transform 
itself under concrete historical conditions establishes the actual threat. 
 
The next autopoietic monster - polycontexturality
11 - gives rise to other deconstructive 
nightmares because it again changes the historical situation drastically. The emergence  of 
a multitude of autonomous spheres of meaning within society, the establishment of their 
own codes and programmes, and, particularly, their operational and observational closure 
against each other produces a new anti-deconstructive immunity. They become resistant to 
the paradoxes of other spheres of meaning. The legal system, for example, deals 
extensively with economic conflicts but remains indifferent towards the economic paradox 
of scarcity, the resolution of which is declared as an economic problem, not as a problem of   15
law. To give another example from law - when constitutional lawyers construct  self-referring 
rules, actually a logical impossibility, they do not care about the Cretan paradox that haunts 
logicians. With cool indifference, they apply self-referring rules in legislative and judicial 
practice.
12 Deconstruction counts in law only if it touches upon the legal paradox itself and 
threatens legal practice in its application of the binary code legal/illegal. Then and only then 
the conceptual machineries of legal doctrine begin their relentless search for ‘saving 
distinctions’. At the beginning of the modern age it was the collapse of  natural law and 
today it is the effect of globalisation which amounted  to a real  threat to the operations of 
the legal system (Teubner, 1998). While natural law hierarchies have been savely replaced 
by the institutionalised practices of legal positivism, the threats of globalisation are still 
provoking modern law and up to now, saving distinctions are not in sight.  
 
Here also, however, polycontexturality  has the effect of  deconstructing deconstruction. 
Polycontexturality makes it possible that social systems externalise their foundational 
paradoxes by shifting them to other social systems. When they are diplaced from one 
social system to the other, they lose their paralysing power. The politicisation of the legal 
and the economic paradoxes are striking historical examples. Both social systems 
successfully externalised  the problems when they institutionalised  a differentiation  
between ‘levels’ of decision making (between the level of adjudication and legislation in 
law, between decisions concerning allocation of money and the actual amount of money in 
the economy) and defined the 'higher level' no longer as a problem for legal  or economic 




The highest degree of deconstruction resistance, however, is attained when second-order 
cybernetics, the difference of operation and self-observation, are firmly institutionalised in 
social systems. The operations of legal systems  (judicial precedents, legislative decisions, 
contracts) then establish an autonomous network of decisions, the validity of which are not 
necessarily dependent on legal self-observations, i.e. on legal argumentation (concepts, 
doctrines, principles, policies), but are merely loosely  connected with them. Such an   16
institutionalised insulation of self-observation and operation creates problems for 
deconstructive practice given that it does not systematically distinguishes texts from social 
institutions, i.e. materialised, long lasting normative structures which are based on 
presumptions of consensus. Contradictions, antinomies and paradoxes, which regularly 
arise in the line of legal argumentation, do not necessarily have an effect on the operational 
decision-making of law. Only when deconstructive moves affect the validity of legislative, 
judicial or contractual decisions, something which recently appeared as a consequence of 
the globalisation crisis of law, then the hectic search for new bases of normative validity 
begins (Wiethölter, 1986:  53; Heller, 1985: 185). 
 
Taken together, autopoiesis, polycontexturality, and second order cybernetics have the 
effect of immunising successfully social systems against their deconstruction. To be sure, 
their immunisation works only temporarily, given that they are time  and again overtaken by 
their own paradoxes. Result of this almost rhythmical play of paradoxification, 
deparadoxification, reparadoxification is an evolutionary dynamics in which deconstruction, 
permanently provoked by its autopoietic subversion, is bound to change its character 
continuously. Variation, selection, retention - should the evolutionary mechanisms that give 
rise to the proliferation of monkeys and social systems also direct the hectic iterational 
movements of différance? But deconstructive darwinism would not be its worst nightmare 
but would instead be the amazing productivity in the interplay of deconstruction and 
autopoietic reconstruction. Paradoxes do not only threaten the structures of social systems 
(legal rules, economic routines), against which they must defend, separate and protect 
themselves. More important is that paradoxes provoke economic and legal institutions for 
the relentless production of new rules and routines. The actual deconstructive obsesssion is 
not with defensive, conservative, systems maintaining their original structures but with their 
insatiable impulse for the invention of new differences. The birth of autopoiesis from the 
spirit of deconstruction? 
 
  IV. Luhmann’s Redemption: The Gift of Justice 
   17
It is often asserted that the blind spot in Luhmann’s systems theory is where other people 
see the person, the individual, the subject (e.g., Frankenberg, 1989: 336).  The assertion is 
plainly wrong. Destruction of the subject, personless systems, anti-humanism -  this critique 
can be successfully levelled at discourse theories as well as at deconstruction (which, for its 
part, can be criticised for a resubjectification of différance) but not to systems theory. 
Luhmann explicitly attributes the dynamic of autopoiesis not only to society but also to 
consciousness. As said above, he circumvents the complementary failures of philosophy of 
conscioussness and language theory by duplicating the sites of meaning production. In 
contrast to Derrida, who silences the distinction mind/society with his comprehensive 
concept of writing, Luhmann separates communication and conscioussness and constructs 
both as autonomous worlds of meaning. In a sense, Luhmann combines Husserl with 
Wittgenstein: he combines the phenomenology of language games with that of 
conscioussness, however, without merging them (as Derrida’s différance or Habermas’ 
intersubjectivity attempt to do) into one. The blind spot of autopoiesis lies somewhere else, 
not in the absence of a subject but precisely in the distinction between two ‘subjects”, in the 
distinction between communication / conscioussness, society / individual, outer / inner, 
system/ system. 
 
One ought not to view this as a flaw to the theory. Rather, it is its greatest achievement. Up 
to now it is Luhmann who has offered  the most plausible construction of  the autonomy of 
the social. Society is a web of communications, nothing else, human beings are in the 
environment of society. Its greatest achievement,  however, necessarily makes it blind for 
the symbolic space where the monades of communication and consciousness meet each 
other. This is the weak point which Habermas has successfully attacked as the 'artificial' 
separation of psychological and social systems (Habermas, 1987: {437ff.}). Of course, 
Luhmann has continuously worked on the blind spot of his theory and attempted again and 
again to compensate for the violence of the mind/society separation. Emotionally loaded 
concepts such as ‘structural coupling’ or ‘interpenetration’ were introduced to reconnect 
psychic and social systems. But the inner logics of the theory  forces him time and again to 
locate the linkages esclusively within the participating systems  themselves. True, Luhmann   18
submits, systems are irritated by their outside world, but irritation is a self-achievement of 
the irritated system in its internal reconstruction of the outside world.  With such conceptual 
manoeuvres, Luhmann tries to minimise, if not to eliminate, the interaction, the translation, 
the interrelation between conscioussness and communication. 
 
Relation, according to Luhmann, is a non-concept, not only as regards inter-subjectivity but 
also inter-systemicity, which can only be dealt with through compensatory observations 
through the sychronisation of actions and their mutual reconstruction. The same 
compensatory mechanism also works in the supertheory’s holy of holies - in the distinction 
of system / environment. Autopoiesis theory is not able to conceptualise the relation 
between system and environment, which is then compensated with secondary constructs of 
structural coupling (Luhmann, 1997: 92ff.). And it is precisely in the holy of holies where 
autopoiesis is haunted by deconstruction. The unity (!) of différance begins to afflict the 
unrevisable multiplicity of autopoietic systems. According to Derrida, the constitution of 
meaning does not appear in separate parallel processes of mutually closed systems - not 
to speak of  a separation of psychic and social systems. Rather, the Derridean différance 
exposes a  differential, transformational, context dependent, continuously contingent but 
interconnected dynamics which resists a clear separation of  its legal, economic, political, 
religious aspects, interactional and organisational patterns, social and psychic 
components, not to speak of their systemic closure (Derrida, 1982). The thesis is that while 
such a concept of différance is incompatible with autopoiesis, it is at the same time its 
necessary supplement. The open dance of heterogenous operations, the infinite network of 
relations, the interplay of various aspects which occurs continuously without transferring 
them to a closed system - these are dangerous supplements to autopoietic closure.  This 
understanding of différance cannot be systematically integrated into autopoiesis, it comes 
from outside as a threatening affliction of closed systems. 
 
The necessary blindness of the system/environment distinction has important 
consequences for a concept of justice. In contrast to popular prejudice, Luhmann does not 
dispose of justice as a hackneyed old-European idea but places it in a central position in   19
his theory of law. But under modern conditions, justice can no longer serve as a criterion for 
the decision of individual cases. Nor is justice the highest internal norm of law, nor an 
external political or moral value which positive law must comply with. Instead justice serves 
as law’s contingency formula, problematising the relation between law and its social 
environment. As compatibility  between adequate social complexity of law and its internal 
consistency of decisions, justice mediates internal and external requirements (Luhmann, 
1993b: 214ff.; 1981: 274ff.; 1974: 23). But here again systems theory cannot deal with the 
environmental relation ’as such’ ,but only asymetrically, either from the inner perspective of 
the legal system of from the external perspective of an observer. The interrelations between 
law and society, the processes of translation from one system into the other, disappear 
again in the blind spot of the system/environment distinction. To be sure, this formulation of 
justice reflects adequately internal requirements of modern positivised law. Under 
conditions of extreme functional differentiation, the internal decision-making consistency of 
law is strained by polycontexturality -  a precarious problem to which the contingency 
formula of justice reacts. Luhmann’s concept of justice is less adequate when it comes to 
institutions in law’s environment, as they appear only as external disturbances of law, that 
endanger consistency to which one can do justice only through a new kind of consistency. 
  
Most importantly however, this concept of justice is not commensurate to the relation of law 
and ‘world’, defined as  the unity of difference of law / non-law, the unity of the difference of 
system / environment. This is the most difficult issue for an autopoietic theory of justice. 
Despite the fact that Luhmann concedes that  
 
the intention of the observation of unity of difference remains possible and 
makes sense in the world of meaning. But this sense takes on the form of a 
paradox, the form of the basic paradox of identity of difference (Luhmann, 
1996: 16). 
 
Under this premise, the unity of difference of law and non-law, for Luhmann, can never be a 
suitable theme of justice, not a theme for the contingency formula of any social system. But   20
it is precisely at this vulnerable point where Derrida (1990: 959) places his difficult and 
unstable distinction between justice and positive law: 
 
a distinction between justice and droit, between justice (infinite, incalculable, 
rebellious to rule and foreign to symmetry, heterogeneous and heterotropic) 
and the exercise of justice as law or right, legitimacy or legality,stabilizable 
and statutory, calculable, a system of regulated and coded prescriptions. 
 
Derrida's conception of justice distinguishes itself from Luhmann's 
 
...just because of this infinity and because of the heteronomic relation to 
others, to the face of otherness that govern me, whose infinity I cannot 
thematize and whose hostage I remain (Derrida, 1990: 959). 
 
This conception of justice - which draws from Levinas' philosophy of alterity - is, paralle to 
Luhmann’s, neither an internal legal norm, nor is it  an external social, moral or political 
condition of law, but aims – now in strong contrast to the case of Luhmann - at the 
transcendence of law, which is  unattainable to legal operations but whose demands they 
are continuously subject to. To the extent that deconstruction emphasises the irreconcilable 
difference between positive law and such a form of justice, it formulates the transcendent 
dimension of law. Ironically, this would, precisely  Luhmann's sense, constitute an 
observation of law and world as unity of the difference of law / non-law which necessarily 
ends in paradoxes. 
 
This is Derrida's central thesis: justice as transcendence in an irreconcilable contrast  to the 
immanence of positive law which, however, is haunting law constantly. And it is here where 
parallels to the relationship of gift to the circulation of the economy become visible. The gift 
is not only, as in Marcel Mauss' Essai sur le don, an ethical or political counter principle of 
the cold economic logic of capitalism. The gift transcends every social relation and 
provokes it - as in the metaphor of the beggar - as an unconditional demand of the Other   21
(Derrida, 1992: {49ff.}). The gift is not pure transcendence without any connection to the 
circulation of the economy, but in a contradictory relation of  unrevisable separation and 
permanent provocation. Thus, Derrida's repeated call for political engagement which are 
provoked by the unsatiated demans of a transcendent justice and gift (Derrida, 1990: 933). 
 
Luhmann's sociology does not address this question. Instead, it is solely concerned with the 
immanence of law, the positivity of legal acts, legal rules, and law’s relation with the social 
environment. Luhmann goes further in only one moment. When the law is confronted with its 
own paradox, then indeed it is  - also and particularly  from the perspective of systems 
theory - exposed to its own transcendence. But systems theory, with its insistence on 
deparadoxification of law, strictly prohibits this exposure. If one is to avoid blockades of 
law’s decisions, then one needs to invisibilise the paradox, not to confront it. Social 
autopoiesis, for the sake of self-continuation, needs to suppress the relationship of social 
systems to transcendence. There is only one social system where this issue is legitimately 
addressed. Only religion as an autonomous social system is entitled to thematise explicitly 
social paradoxes. Religion and no other social system deals with the symbolisation of the 
third which is excluded by the difference between system and environment (Luhmann, 1996; 
1990; 1985; 1984). 
 
By contrast, Derrida's gift of justice poses uncomfortable questions to autopoietics. Most 
embarrassing is one question: Is there a particular experience of the transcendence of law? 
In this perspective, the legal paradox is no longer exclusively observed from the standpoint 
of its avoidance but is observed under the question of whether legal language has the 
capacity to symbolise what lies beyond law as the utopia of law (Blecher, 1991). While it 
remains correct that positive law can only arise out of the invisibilisation of the legal 
paradox, a concept of justice, separate from positive law but connected to it, would then 
directly confront  the paradox of law and no more deal only with law’s internal consistency or 
with its environmental adequacy. Instead of being the formula for law’s contingency formula, 
justice would be the formula of its transcendence. Questions of justice would not  merely be 
concerned with esoteric law or with theoretical speculations but with the practical   22
experience which comes about when criterias of justice are considered. One should not 
deny that it makes an important difference in the practice of law if one is exposed to 
‘deconstructive justice’, to extreme demands of a justice that can never be realized, to the 
almost unbearable experience of an infinite responsibility, to a sense of fundamental failure 
of law, even a tragic experience of whatever you decide in law will end in injustice and guilt. 
The symbolisation of transcendence would then no longer be limited to religion, as a 
specialised social system, but would be an authentic experience for the legal system itself, 
as it would also be for the economic and other social systems whose contingency formulas 
are based around their specific experiences of  paradox. Why should the transcendence 
formulas of social institutions be exclusively dealt with in the system of religion and not 
within these institutions themselves? Justice is too important to be left up to priests (let 
alone to lawyers). Should one not view - and this is the question I shall end with - Derrida's 
profound and demanding analyses of the commonalities and the differences of gift and 
justice, the transcendence formulas of the economy and the law, as a new, original and 
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